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Privileging Asymmetric Warfare?
Part I: Defender Duties under International
Humanitarian Law
Samuel Estreicher*
Abstract
This article is part of a three-part series addressing the question whether the law of
armed conflict, also called internationalhumanitarianlaw (HL), privileges aform ofguerrilla
warfare y nonstate actors that is often conducted in violation of these laws and in the process
endangers civilians, in pursuit of a strategy of inviting a responsefrom their opponents that
helps them enlist additionalrecruits and internationalsupport. The strategy, rationalfromthe
standpoint of the guerrillaforces, derogates signficanty from the law's overall objective of
minimiing harm to civilian populations. The articles in this series approach this question of
asymmetry by considering whether IHL in fact need or should be interpretedto privilege the
guerrillastrategy.
Most discussions of the laws of warfocus on the limitationsplaced on attackers to avoid
risks to civilians. The purpose of this article is to look at the issue from the standpoint of the
duties of defenders to avoid such risks. Dangers to civilians during armed conflict are ajoint
product of both attackers and defenders, and minimiZation of such harm-presumably the
overriding mission of IHL-requires establishing the right incentives for both attackers and
defenders.

*

Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Co-Director, Opperman Institute for Judicial
Administration, New York University School of Law. This paper was initially presented at the
Conference on Israel and International Law, Northwestern University School of Law, May 17,
2010. This is the first of a three-part series under the overall title, "Privileging Asymmetric
Warfare?" The second part, subtitled "The 'Proportionality' Principle under International
Humanitarian Law," and third part, subtitled "The Deliberate Killing of Civilians under
International Humanitarian Law," will be published in the Summer 2011 issue of volume 12 of
the Chicago Journal of International Law. I am much indebted to my dear colleagues Laurence
Gold of Brehoff & Kaiser and Ryan Goodman of NYU Law for their comments and criticisms;
all remaining errors lie entirely with the author. 0 2010 by Samuel Estreicher. All rights are
reserved.
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Subsequent articles in the series will address the principle of 'roportionaity " the duty
of attackers to avoid use of excessiveforce that may imperil civilians, even if they are not being
targeted-and consider whether intentional targeting of civilians during armed conflicts by
nonstate actors constitutes a war crime underIHL
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I. THE CHANGING PARADIGM
The law of armed conflict' has moved away from a contractual model to
embrace a largely regulatory model. At one time the paradigm conflict involved
standing armies of warring states clashing in a distinct "battlefield" removed
from dense civilian settlements. The "laws of war" established ground-rules in
an effort to limit "unnecessary" slaughter-killing and maiming not necessary to
achieving the decisive defeat of the adversary-and to limit resort to certain
weapons that could have enduring devastating effects beyond cessation of the
conflict. The rules were kept in place not by pious invocation of the sanctity of
agreement but by the rule of reciprocity: the prospect that non-compliance
would incur retaliatory sanctions against the offending state.
The horrific experience of World War II and its immediate aftermath led to
a partial shift in emphasis in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva I-IV) away
from the contractual model inching towards a regulatory model. "International
humanitarian law" (IHL) was the new name for rules that supplemented the
prior laws of war with greater protections for prisoners of war, further limits on

I

The phrases "laws of war," "law of armed conflict" and "international humanitarian law" are
often used interchangeably; the author's preference is for "international humanitarian law" (IHL).
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the range of permissible targets, and, most especially with regard to Geneva IV,
an overarching concern with the protection of civilians under occupation and
during armed conflicts. Most importantly, for present purposes, the obligations
of "High Contracting Parties" were not backed by a rule of reciprocity. These
obligations apply "in all circumstances"-at least as between parties to the
Convention and non-parties agreeing to assume those obligations 2 -and cannot
be suspended, or violations excused, because the adversary has flouted the rules
of proper warfare.
The model of two warring state armies locked in combat at a battlefield
that could readily be distinguished from civilian settlements had been battered
during World War II, as cities were treated as targets of legitimate bombing. The
model also failed to fit guerrilla warfare-battle by irregulars not necessarily
linked with state armies, typified by the "partisan" forces that often provided the
only armed resistance to Nazi occupiers. The essential military theory of guerrilla
warfare is to strike the enemy and then merge back into the civilian population
in the hope either of discouraging a counter-attack or, of even greater value to
the cause, inviting a military response laying waste to civilian areas and their
inhabitants. The latter is often the preferable outcome for the guerrilla fighters
because, in the battle to win over local populations, civilian devastation at the
hands of the attacker can be more valuable than directly causing losses to the
attacker. The conventional response of the laws of war to guerrilla warfare was
that because these irregulars did not adhere to the core principle of
"distinction"-they did not adequately distinguish themselves and their
operations from civilians-they were unprivileged combatants not entitled to
protection as prisoners of war, their military campaign constituted an illegitimate
attempt to operate outside the laws of war, and blame for harm to civilians was
attributable to their tactics rather than the lack of care of attackers.3

2

Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV), 6 UST
3516, TIAS No 3365 (1949), reprinted in Gary D. Sols and Fred L. Borch, Geneva Conventions 183
(Kaplan 2010). Under Common Article 2, even if the conflict is with a non-party to the
Convention, "the Powers that are Parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations" and shall "be bound by the Convention in relation to [the non-party], if the latter
accepts and applies the provisions thereof." Id. However, even where the conflict is with a nonparty that has not assumed the obligations of the Convention, if the conflict is otherwise within
the scope of the Convention, obligations would still be owed to persons or property protected by
the Convention. In addition, as will be explored below, important aspects of Geneva IV, as well
as the 1977 Additional Protocols, are deemed binding on all parties to armed conflict as a matter
of customary international law. See notes 11 & 16.

3

See also note 15.
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With Yalta's division of Europe between Western and Soviet spheres of
influence and the ensuing nuclear stalemate between the US and the Soviet
Union, states as such stopped fighting each other.' But all was not the bright
future promised by the Kellogg-Briand pact. What had been "irregular"
increasingly became commonplace. Insurgencies became the prototypical armed
conflict-"wars of national liberation" fought by communist armies; native
groups seeking independence from their colonial overlords or the overthrow of
the apartheid regimes of South Africa and what had been called Rhodesia; and
the Arab-Palestinian militias warring with Israel.
II. 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The 1977 Additional Protocols to Geneva (AP I and AP II) reflect an
attempt to update IHL to address this new prototype of warfare.' Given the
absence of a traditional battlefield and the dangers to civilians inherent in the
guerrilla-warfare strategy, one might have hoped that this re-articulation of IHL
would have focused on how best to protect civilians during these conflicts.
Sadly, despite Western sponsorship of the overall effort, what the parties
achieved arguably privileged certain aspects of the guerrilla strategy and thus
detracted from the overall aim of enhancing the protection of civilians. In
response, the US and several of its Western allies, including Israel, refused to
ratify AP I, which deals with international armed conflicts. Over time, however,
the allies broke ranks. Currently, the sole significant remaining holdouts are the
US, India, Israel, and Pakistan. These countries claim to adhere to AP I to the
extent it reflects customary international law (CIL). The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which sees itself as the guardian and
advocate of the Geneva process, has over the years documented purported state
practices in line with AP I prescriptions in order to lay the case for the essential
equivalence between AP I and customary law.'

4

Notable exceptions include the Israeli-Arab wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, the Iraq-Iran war, and
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

s

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("AP I"), 1125 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1977)
and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II), 1125 UN Treaty Ser 609
(1978).
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 & 2 Customay International
HumanitarianLaw (Cambridge 2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customay InternationalLaw:

6

A Contribution to the Understandingand Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 Intl Rev Red
Cross 175 (2005). For initial criticism of the ICRC study, see W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customay
Law Study: A Preiminay Assessment, 99 Am Soc'y Intl L Proc 208 (2005); Letter from John
Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, US Dept of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, US Dept
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What the US opposed, and presumably still opposes, is AP I's
legitimization of guerrilla warfare in the definition of covered conflicts and its
protection of combatants who do not adhere to the traditional criteria for
distinguishing themselves from civilians. Objection has also been raised to
particular rules that, because of their amorphous reach, would hamper the ability
of the US and other attackers to achieve military objectives without inviting
scrutiny for alleged "war crimes."' The US also questions AP I-inspired
restrictions on its use of drones for targeted killings against Al Qaeda in Iraq and
Afghanistan.'
An additional criticism is that there are aspects of AP I that derogate from
the treaty's overarching objective of minimizing harm to civilians-provisions
making it easier for defenders to pursue the guerrilla strategy of situating their
armed elements within the civilian population in order to invite attacks that kill
civilians and thus generate further support for their cause. AP I does so by, inter
alia, creating an exception from the principle of distinction in certain conflicts,"o

of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Intl Comm of the Red Cross, Regarding
Customary International Law Study, 46 ILM 514 (2007).

7

See Ronald Reagan, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratfyf ProtocolI to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection
of War Victims: Letter of Transmittal, 81 Am J Intl L 910, 911 (1987); Abraham D. Sofaer, The
Rationalefor the United States Decision, 82 Am J Intl L 784, 785 (1988). On the categorization issue,
compare Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel & Unlawful Combatants, 12 The Green Bag 2d
397, 399-400 (2009), and William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient
Features,28 Yale J Intl L 319, 322, with David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: CombatingA/.Qaeda within
the Law of War, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 957, 987-96 (2009); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of
Civilians in Armed Conct, 103 Am J Intl L 48, 49-51 (2009), and Derek Jinks, The Declining
Signoicance ofPOW Status, 45 Harv Int L J 367, 372-375 (2004).

8

Despite the refusal to ratify AP I, the United States claims to adhere to Article 57 as a matter of
customary law. See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionakiyand Protocol I in Conventional Warfare,
98 Milit L Rev 91, 103-104 (1982); Taft, 28 Yale J Intl L at 319, 322 (2003) (cited in note 7)
(suggesting US adherence to AP Articles 48-52 and 57 as a matter of CIL).

9

Compare Philip Alston, United Naions Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudidal,summay or arbitrary executions, Study on targeted killings, A/HRC/14/25/Add.6 (May 28,
2010), with Remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Dept. of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law (Am Society of Intl Law 2010), online at
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (visited Nov 20, 2010).

10

AP I's Article 44(3) allows insurgents to fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
in certain circumstances when resisting "alien occupation" and in conflicts within Article 1(4). See
Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Douglas J. Feith's Law in the Senice of Terror-The Strange Case of the
AdditionalProtocol, 20 Akron L Rev 261, 276-77 (1986) (explaining views of state delegations that
"the situations described in the second sentence of Article 44(3) are very exceptional and can exist
only in occupied territory and in conflicts described in Article 1(4)"). With the resolution of the
anti-Apartheid struggle, this means that to the extent Hamas and other organizations are fighting
Israeli occupation (itself unclear after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza), they may be permitted
by AP I to violate this aspect of the principle of distinction and still retain prisoner-of-war
protections.
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outlawing any resort to reprisals targeting civilians" to punish violations of the
rules of war,' 2 and making it difficult to launch attacks against irregulars hiding
among civilians without encountering accusations of war crimes.
This is all well understood and perhaps explains the continued refusal of
the US and Israel to ratify AP I. Nonetheless, AP I is likely to set the prevailing
legal framework for the law of armed conflict for many decades to come. Given
the vast number of nations that have acceded to the treaty, the opportunity to
open up AP I to significant revision is a ship that has left port and is not likely
soon to return. Amendments to multilateral treaties are extremely difficult. 4 The
political economy of such an effort likely spells failure because the US and Israel
are, for all practical purposes, the only encumbered parties." Most of the
developed nations do not themselves engage in, or (like the UK and other
reluctant NATO allies) seek to disengage from, armed conflict as attackers; they
also derive some benefit from moral criticism of the US and Israel as
encumbered parties. Moreover, most developing nations have little to fear from
IHL because their repression of internal conflicts is not likely to meet Geneva
IV or AP I thresholds for coverage; and the provisions of Common Article 3

11

12

13

14
15

"Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal
obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation to take
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57." Geneva IV, AP I Art 51 at 277 (cited in note
5).
See Sofaer, 82 Am J Intl L at 785 (cited in note 7) (AP I "eliminates significant remedies in cases
where an enemy violates the Protocol. The total elimination of the right of reprisal, for example,
would hamper the ability of the United States to respond to an enemy's intentional disregard of
the limitations established in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or Protocol I, for the purpose of
deterring such disregard."); Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging Wars: The Case Against
Ratfication of Additional Protocol I, 26 Va J Intl L 109, 142 (1985) ("Indeed, the new restrictions
imposed by Protocol I would virtually eliminate reprisals as a lawful method of enforcing the laws
of war, leaving enemy combatant troops and military property as the only lawful objectives against
which reprisals could be taken.").
This is the subject of my forthcoming article, Pridleging Agmmetric Warfare? Part II: The
'Proportionaliy" Prinnple under InternaionalHumanitanan Law, Chicago Journal of International Law
(Summer 2011).
Even if the United States were to ratify AP I with significant reservations, those reservations
would not likely influence proclamations of the customary law confirmed by AP I's text.
This is true even if there is reason to give considerable weight to the state practice of nations
actually involved in armed conflicts. See North Sea ContinentalSheF Cases, (Ger t Den, Ger v Neth),
1969 ICJ 3, 32-33 (Feb 20, 1969) ("State practice during that period, including that of States
whose interests were specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in
the sense of the provision invoked and should have occurred in such a way as to show a general
recognition that a rule of law was involved."). See generally Theodore Meron, The Continuing Role
ofCustom in the Formation ofInternadona/fHumanitaianLap, 90 Am J Intl L 238 (1996).
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and AP II, which do apply to certain non-international armed conflicts, have yet
to present significant restrictions on parties to such conflicts."
III. DUTIES OF DEFENDERS IN IHL
My purpose here is not to enter into a debate on whether or how AP I may
be said to place improper limits on attackers. Rather, my purpose is to open a
discussion of the extent to which AP I and other sources of IHL articulate the
duties of defenders." Dangers to civilians during armed conflict are a joint
product of both attackers and defenders, and minimization of such harmpresumably the overriding mission of IHL-requires establishing the right
incentives for both attackers and defenders.
Politics is the art of the possible. I would suggest that our work as
academics and publicists is within the same domain. What needs to be addressed
is whether, under current law, defenders are under real obligations to minimize
risks to civilians; and, if so, what can be done within the realm of the politically
possible to change the discourse of the international law community so that
defender violations are taken seriously and sanctioned."
16

17

1s
19

But see Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction (Dec 2, 1995), 35 ILM
32 (1996) (finding that parties to arguably non-international conflict within Bosnia and
Herzegovina entered into an agreement based on the Common Article 3 of Geneva; moreover,
the UN Security Council in the Statute of the International Tribunal in 1993 referred to "the laws
and customs of war" so as to capture both international and non-international aspects of the
conflict). See generally Meron, 90 Am J Intl L 238 (cited in note 15).
Under Article 49(1) of AP I, "'[aittacks' means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or in defence." Attackers engage in such acts of violence. Although there is no definition
of defenders as such, Article 48 states the "Basic rule" of Part IV of the Protocol dealing with the
"Civilian Population" as requiring that "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives...." In addition to the principle of distinction which applies to all parties to the conflict
and is not in terms limited to attackers, Article 51(1) states that the "[tihe civilian population and
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations."
The phrase "dangers arising from such military operations" suggests a broader protective ambit
that is not limited to attacks. Geneva IV, AP I Articles 48, 49, and 51 at 276-77 (cited in note 5).
This paper assumes for the purpose of discussion that AP I, including the protocol's overarching
commitment to minimize dangers to civilians in armed conflict, generally reflects CIL.
The applicability of international norms to nonstate actors requires some discussion. Let us take,
for example, the Palestinians. In June 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO"), on
behalf of the Government of the State of Palestine, acceded to Geneva and AP I and II and
became bound by their terms. However, "[o]n September 13, 1989, the Swiss Federal Council
informed the States that it was not in a position to decide whether the PLO's letter constituted an
instrument of accession, due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the
existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine". International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC"), Palestine, International Humanitarian Law-Treaties & Documents, online at
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=PS (visited Nov 11, 2010). On the other hand, because
Israel has not ratified AP I, the provisions of AP I, to the extent they exceed Geneva and do not
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A. Sources of Duties
Although AP I reverses the prior customary law that placed on
defenders virtually the entire obligation to avoid civilian losses,20 the Protocol
leaves in place a substantial core of defender obligations. 2 ' The sources of
defender duties would seem to include:
1. The prohibition of civilian shields
* Geneva IV, Art 28: "The presence of a protected person may not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations." 22
* AP I, Art 51(7): "The presence or movements of the civilian
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in
reflect CIL, would not be binding on the Palestinian Authority in any armed conflict with Israel.
In addition, Hamas has acceded neither to Geneva nor AP I, which raises the interesting question
whether the PLO or PA binds all Palestinian armed forces by its accession, or whether Hamas is
bound by Geneva and AP I and II only to the extent these instruments reflect CIL. See generally
Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in InternationalLaw (Cambridge 2002);
Michael Bothe, War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conficts, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala
Tabory, eds, War Crimes in InternationalLaw 293, 302-03 (Martinus Nijhoff 1996); Yoram Dinstein,
The InternationalLawof Civil Wars and Human Rights, 6 Israel YB Hum Rts 62 (1976).
20

As W. Hays Parks observes in his classic article:
In customary international law the primary responsibility for preventing
collateral civilian casualties rests with the defender and the individual civilian,
with little or no responsibility imposed upon an attacker. The reason for the
existing rule is simple. Under most circumstances, the attacker has no idea
where civilians are located and, except for a warning, has no way of controlling
the location or movement of individual civilians or the civilian population; the
civilian population is in the exclusive control of the defender.
The practice of all nations that carried out aerial bombardment operations
during World Wars I and II establishes clearly that no nation concerned itself
with the risk of injury to the civilian population of an enemy nation incidental
to the conduct of military operations. Protocol I constitutes an improvement
in the law of war in recognizing that an attacker should, in most cases, give
consideration to minimization of collateral civilian casualties. The issue is the
degree to which an attacker should assume this responsibility. If the new rules
of Protocol I are to have any credibility, the predominant responsibility must
remain with the defender, who has control over the civilian population.

21

22

W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AF L Rev 1, 153-54 (1990) (emphasis in original).
Defender duties are rarely discussed in the literature. In addition to Parks, 32 AF L Rev (cited in
note 20), see Matthew C. Waxman, InternationalLaw and the Politics of Urban Air Operations 15-18
(Rand 2000); Matthew C. Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender The Law and Strategy of Cities as Targets, 39
Va J Intl L 353 (1999); Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in InternationalHumanitarian Law, 47
Colum J Transnatl L 292, 301-22 (2009).
Geneva IV, Art 28 at 197 (cited in note 2). "The prohibition is expressed in an absolute form and
applies to the belligerents' own territory as well as to occupied territory, to small sites as well as to
wide areas." ICRC, Commentary on the AdditionalProtocols of8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 209 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno
Zimmermann, eds) ("ICRC Commentary").
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attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield,
favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict
shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives
from attacks or to shield military operations." 23
2. The prohibition of perfidy
* AP I, Art 37(1): "It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an
adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged
to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence, shall
constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy: ... (c)
the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status .... "24
3. The duty to protect the civilian population against dangers from
military operations 25
* AP I, Art 48: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." 26
* AP I, Art 51(1): "The civilian population and individual civilians
shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military
operations." 27

23

Geneva IV, AP I Art 51(7) at 277 (cited in note 5). Similarly, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court includes within its listing of war crimes "utilizing the
presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, area or military forces
immune from military operations." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome
Statute"), Art 8(2)(b)(xxiii), UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1988), reprinted in Christian
Rosbaud and Otto Triffterer, eds, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Coud 13 (Nomo
Verlagsgesellschaft 2000).

24

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 37(1) at 273 (cited in note 5).

25

Since this paper focuses on defender duties, provisions dealing with the duty to minimize harm to
civilians during "attacks" are omitted.
Geneva IV, AP I, Art 48 at 276 (cited in note 5). This is captioned the "Basic rule" of Part IV of
the Protocol dealing with the "Civilian Population": "The basic rule of protection and distinction
is confirmed in this article. It is the foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs
of war rests: the civilian population and civilian objects must be respected and protected in armed
conflict, and for this purpose they must be distinguished from combatants and military objectives.
The entire system established in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and in Geneva from 1864 to 1977
is founded on this rule of customary law." ICRC, Commentary at 209, 598 (cited in note 22).

26

27

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 51(1) at 277 (cited in note 5). What follows is a list of specific rules "[t]o
give effect to this protection," but without suggestion that list exhausts the content of the duty to
provide "general protection against dangers arising from military operations."
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AP I, Art 57(1): "In the conduct of military operations, constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects." 28
* AP I, Art 57(4): "In the conduct of military operations at sea or in
the air, each Party to the conflict shall in conformity with its rights
and duties under the rules of international law applicable to armed
conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian
lives and damage to civilian objects." 29
4. The duty to remove civilians from and not locate them in the vicinity
of military objectives
* AP I, Art. 58: "The parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum
extent feasible: (a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth
Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the
vicinity of military objectives; (b) avoid locating military objectives
within or near densely populated areas; (c) take the other necessary
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual citizens
and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting
from military operations." 30
5. The duty to avoid methods or means of warfare that cause
unnecessary injury or suffering
* AP I, Art. 35:
*

28

29
30

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57(1) at 279 (cited in note 5). Paragraphs 2-3 and 5 apply to "attacks" but
the first and fourth paragraphs speak more generally of "the conduct of military operations,"
which should include actions and omissions of defenders. When the ICRC comments that the
word "operations" "refers to military operations during which violence is used" and to "all
movements and acts related to hostilities that are undertaken by armed forces," this cannot
reasonably be read to exempt defender actions or operations which are also operations "during
which violence is used" or "acts related to hostilities that are undertaken by armed forces."
Rather, the distinction is between such combat operations and "ideological, political or religious
campaigns." ICRC, Commentary at 600 (cited in note 22).
Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57(4) at 280 (cited in note 5).
Geneva IV, AP I, Art 58 at 280 (cited in note 5). It has been suggested that the wording of the
provisions contained in Article 58 indicates they are merely hortatory, not obligatory. See Parks,
32 AF L Rev at 159 (cited in note 20). The ICRC commentary does not take this position but
does acknowledge that "a Party to the conflict cannot be expected to arrange its armed forces and
installations in such a way as to make them conspicuous to the benefit of the adversary...." ICRC,
Commentary, at 693 (cited in note 22). Professor Michael Schmitt observes that "the norm applies
only in territory under the effective control of a force" and that "valid military or humanitarian
reasons may exist for failing to move civilians away from military objectives or situating military
forces near them; for instance, evacuation of the civilian population during urban combat can
place that population at greater risk or may be militarily imprudent." Schmitt, 47 Colum J
Transnatl L at 304 (cited in note 21). No authority is offered for the latter suggestion that colocation of military operations and civilian populations can be justified on grounds of military
advantage or prudence.
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1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ ... methods of warfare of a nature
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.3'

B. Implications
Any inquiry into whether the parties to an armed conflict have complied
with the laws of war requires a two-stage inquiry: asking not only (1) whether
attackers have transgressed the limits IHL places on attacks, but also (2) whether
defenders have observed the limits IHL places on what fighters can do to
defend themselves. Both steps of the inquiry are essential.
1. Relevance of compliance with defender duties to attacker duties.
It is clear that attackers cannot, because of defender violations, claim
excuse for their non-compliance with, say, their duty to "do everything feasible
to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects" under AP I, Article 57(2)(a)(i).12 But the feasibility inquiry under Article
57(2)(a)(i), or the proportionality inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(iii), necessarily
requires that account be taken of whether defenders have disguised military
operations as civilian operations or have deliberately embedded their military
assets in close proximity to civilian areas, all in violation of defender obligations
under IHL. Similarly, the duty to provide "effective warning ... of attacks which
may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit" under
Article 57(2)(c) must take account of defender actions. The effectiveness of a
warning is a joint product both of the message and its mode of delivery and
what defenders do, including what they tell civilians, upon receipt of the
warning.
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33

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 35 at 277 (cited in note 5). "Methods or means of warfare" should include
the defender strategy of shooting missiles from batteries located in dense civilian populations and
other decisions to locate military objects in close proximity to civilians. Id.
Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57(2)(c)(i) at 279 (cited in note 5).
See Parks, 32 AF L Rev at 158 and n 469 (cited in note 20). Similar considerations may have
informed the Obama administration's view of the legality of the use of drone attacks against highlevel Al Qaeda leaders: "As you know, this is a conflict with an organized terrorist enemy that
does not have conventional forces, but that plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies
while hiding among civilian populations." Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law
(cited in note 9). They also help explain the conclusions reached in the Final Report of the ICC
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 ILM 1257, 1271 (2000).
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2. Urging investigation of defender actions as a
concomitant of any investigation of attacker actions.

necessary

Scholarship and advocacy need to bring defender duties to the forefront of
any discussion and investigation of armed conflicts. The necessarily joint
contribution of both attackers and defenders to civilian harm must be
recognized. Any investigation of an armed conflict must focus on the duties of
both sides to the conflict and evaluate the feasibility of attacker compliance with
some of the more open-ended obligations of IHL. For example, the duty to
avoid excessive or disproportionate force, as stated in AP I Article 57(2),
requires attackers to "refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated...."3" While attackers
are not excused of their obligation because of defender violations, their ability to
identify beforehand who are civilians and what are civilian objects may be
significantly hampered when defenders use civilians as shields or civilian objects
as bases for their military operations.35
3. Urging linkage of attacker
elaboration of IHL.

and defender

duties

in

further

There are open areas in IHL. States that have acceded to AP I are not
necessarily bound by all ICRC interpretations and they and states that have
declined to ratify AP I can play an active role in formulating and urging others to
adopt rules of practice that strike the right balance between attacker and
defender duties.
Even if, for example, there is widespread international recognition that, at
some abstract level, the duty of proportionality is grounded in customary law,
the content of that duty is not necessarily identical to the wording contained in
AP Article 57 or the gloss provided by ICRC commentary. The effectiveness of
such a duty, including the ability of military commanders to implement it in the
air and on the ground, may well depend on serious consideration, elaboration,
and implementation of defender duties, for defenders are often in the superior
position to minimize civilian exposure to the dangers of military operations. 36

34

Geneva IV, AP I, Art 57(2) at 279 (cited in note 5).

35

For further elaboration, see Estreicher, The 'Proportionality' Principle (cited in note

36

Although revision of AP I is highly unlikely, perhaps agreement could be reached on the drafting
of a new protocol, or even a joint declaration by major military powers, addressing in a more
comprehensive fashion defender duties under IHL.
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Defender duties in armed conflicts is a neglected area of IHL. This needs
to change if the overall mission of this body of law-minimization of harm to
civilians-is to have any reasonable prospect of being realized.
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